In order to stay in the UK lawfully after the end of the transition period, all EU citizens in the UK have to apply for status under the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS). Under the Scheme, EU citizens will be given either pre-settled or settled status. For an applicant to the EU Settlement Scheme to receive either pre-settled or settled status, they will have to prove three key things: their identity, their suitability, and a period of continuous residence in the UK.
For most applicants, this will be relatively straightforward. This briefing focuses on three groups of applicants for whom proving these things will be slightly more complicated: frontier workers, people with a criminal sentence, and extended family members. Of course, many other applicants will find the EUSS confusing or hard to navigate, and numerous other vulnerable groups in society have been identified as at risk of failing to secure their rights. This briefing focuses on specific issues with these three groups to break things up a little.
The Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK provides that frontier workers must receive documents certifying their status as soon as possible, so that they are not prevented from exercising their rights after the end of the transition period, and can easily demonstrate proof of those rights at the border. That is why the government is launching a frontier worker permit scheme on 10 December, so that frontier workers can make free applications to receive such a document. Although this is a welcome development, the scheme seems to be cutting it quite short as it opens a mere three weeks before the end of the transition period, with very little information available as to the qualifying criteria and precise application process. Surprisingly, there seems to be more information available for family members of frontier workers than for frontier workers themselves, as there seems to be little certainty about what exactly is required of them
As for EU citizens without a right of permanent residence whose residence is interrupted by a period of imprisonment, the Withdrawal Agreement states that the “conduct” of these citizens may have an effect on their application under the Scheme. “Conduct” here relates to actions taken by the affected citizen, rather than the outcome of the action such as a sentence of imprisonment, meaning it is not the time or severity of the prison sentence but of the conduct which is important in assessing the relevant citizen’s eligibility.
Appendix EU clearly states that continuous qualifying period cannot include a period of imprisonment. In fact, EU law stipulates that periods of imprisonment in the host Member State interrupt the continuity of residence required by Article 16(2) of the Free Movement Directive for the purpose of acquiring a right of permanent residence.
There will be situations where the conduct of the citizen is committed before the end of the transition period, and the conduct is not be serious enough to result in their removal from the UK, but their prison sentence will conclude after the end of the transition period. If this is the case, the only route to status under the EU Settlement Scheme would be if the applicant already had settled status before he committed the offence. If he had been in the UK for less than five years when the offence was committed, and does not have settled status, he will not be able to acquire it. A citizen cannot link periods residence in the member state that are dissected by a term of imprisonment which in this example, began before the end of the transition period.
The result is that a citizen who was in prison during the transition period, but does not meet the threshold for removal from the UK, cannot begin a continuous qualifying period to obtain EUSS status. They are highly unlikely to be able to obtain any other immigration status due to the restrictive nature of UK immigration law and would consequently face removal on the basis that they do not have any lawful residence after 30 June 2020.
Lastly, concerning extended family members, Appendix EU requires that durable partners and dependent relatives apply to the EUSS with a valid “relevant document". The definition of a relevant document is a document issued for under the EEA Regulations. It can be a family permit, a residence card or a permanent residence card. Important to note is that the relevant document must be valid (i.e. not expired or revoked), meaning that an extended family member who has been issued a document which has now expired is unable to apply to the EUSS and will receive an automatic refusal of status should they submit an application. In effect, this raises the financial bar for durable partners of EU citizens, as they are required to make a second application under the EEA Regulations to receive a valid relevant document and then make a third application for EUSS status. The application fee here is 65 pounds.
This fee is entirely avoidable. In fact, when an extended family member applies to the EUSS, the process assesses whether the family relationship continues to exist (or did for a 5 year period in the past). Therefore, it is available to the Home Office to assess the continuing family relationship of an extended family member applicant through the EUSS process, even where their relevant document has expired. The Home Office approach puts a disproportionate burden on these applicants not only financially, but also practically, as they have to evidence and re-evidence their family relationships which could be considered detrimental to the rights of their sponsoring EU citizens.
Once family members of EU nationals succeed in their application and get status under the Settlement Scheme, they are issued a physical document to prove their right to residency in the UK. This physical document is a privilege not granted to EU citizens, meaning that in practice, durable partners receive physical proof of their status when the EU citizens on whose application they depend do not.
If you require any advice on the EUSS as a member of one of these three vulnerable groups of EU citizens or otherwise, do not hesitate to contact us for advice.
If you need assistance you can contact us here, call us on 020 8142 8211 or send us a question on WhatsApp.
Since officially leaving the European Union (EU) on 31 January 2020, the UK has been navigating an 11-month transition period negotiated by Theresa May and later Boris Johnson. During the transition period, EU law still applies in the UK, even though the UK is no longer formally a member of the EU.
That transition period is set to end on 31 December 2020. On that day, various important changes happen automatically, because from 1 January 2021, EU law will no longer be directly applicable in the UK. For immigration purposes, the most widely discussed change following from that will be that on the 1st of January, free movement of people ends, and the rebranded points-based immigration system is coming into full force to replace it. Obviously, the end of free movement is a big deal. There will, however, be numerous other significant changes to migration as a consequence of Brexit. One such area is asylum.
Asylum regulation is based on a number of international, EU and domestic laws. The relevant international law is set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention, and the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The applicability of those texts will not be affected by Brexit, the end of the transition period, or any other event to do with the EU, as their legal basis is not in EU law. Despite the ECHR’s name, it is not an EU treaty, and the Strasbourg human rights court is not an EU body – so these laws will continue to apply.
EU law, however, is a different story. Due to the Common European Asylum System, the end of the transition period will heavily affect individuals claiming asylum in the UK, as the EU law relevant to asylum will no longer be automatically applicable in the UK. Some of it will be repealed immediately and replaced by domestic law, such as Home Secretary Priti Patel’s infamous Immigration Bill implementing the points-based system and end of free movement in practice. Another piece of legislation set to be repealed is the Dublin III Regulation. The purpose of the Dublin Regulation is to determine which State is responsible for examining an asylum application. The legislation is marked down for immediate repeal because it is meaningless without cooperation of other EU member states.
In very simple terms, the Dublin Regulation allows the UK to return asylum seekers to another EU country if they passed their on their way to the UK. In less simple terms, Dublin III sets out mechanisms determine which country should assume responsibility of asylum seekers within their borders, and to return them to those responsible countries. The Regulation is intended to ensure quick access to asylum procedures and reduce double handling of asylum claims by different States.
Important to note is that Dublin III does not allow for the UK or any member state to return asylum seekers to their country of origin, or outside of the EU. It applies to asylum seekers within the bloc, and determines which member state is responsible for processing their claim. The Dublin III Regulation utilises a host of criteria to determine where an asylum seeker should claim asylum, ranging from family unity, to possession of residence documents or visas and irregular entry or stay. The latter has become something of a hot topic in recent months, as reports of migrants crossing the channel in small boats from France have risen, and inflammatory remarks from the government has led to much commotion. At some point, Home Secretary Patel stated she wanted the British navy to patrol the seas in order to send illegal channel crossers back to France. This idea was quickly dismissed, as it turned out that it would only be legal under international law if the country whose waters the migrants would be sent back to (in this case France) agreed to the return, but the narrative presented has remained the same.
Ms. Patel has frequently justified returning channel crossers to France on the idea that their asylum claims in the UK are “illegal” because they arrived in France first, and then entered the UK illegally. This is not exactly true. There are limits, legally, to the extent irregular entry can be used as a reason for transfer back to the first point of entry. For example, the principle can be outweighed by other primary considerations such as family unity. Additionally, a Member State will be responsible for a claim submitted by a person who has been living there for at least five consecutive months, even when that person first gained entry into the EU by an irregular crossing of a border in another Member State. So, if an asylum seeker entered the UK via France, but has been in the UK for over five months since, they cannot be returned to France and the UK will automatically assume responsibility.
In 2019, statistics indicate that 714 individuals were transferred into the UK based on Dublin III rules, and 263 were transferred out to another EU country. Numbers have been steadily rising since the Brexit referendum, indicating a push to complete as many Dublin III transfers as possible before the Regulation stops to apply.
The government has given no indication that it plans on introducing a post-Brexit successor to the Dublin Regulation. Instead, it has proposed two draft agreements with the EU which relate to certain specific aspects of the Dublin Regulation. On the one hand, the government is looking to come to an agreement on the transfer of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children for family reunion purposes, and on the other, it has proposed a readmission agreement for accepting returns of irregularly residing UK/EU citizens and third country nationals. Both of these proposals are much narrower than the Dublin Regulation allowed for.
None of these proposals have been accepted by the EU, and the Government has said that it might pursue bilateral agreements with individual Member States if it cannot secure EU-wide agreements. It is unclear whether these individual agreements would be compatible with the EU’s exclusive competence/power over migration policy, and so whether they will be possible at all. The end of Dublin III hence leaves a gap in UK immigration law that is unlikely to be filled before the ever-approaching end of the transition period.
If you need assistance you can contact us here, call us on 020 8142 8211 or send us a question on WhatsApp.
The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) is currently putting together a review of the EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) to present to the government. As the official lawyers contracted by the European Union (EU) to provide legal and policy advice to the European Delegation in the United Kingdom on the EUSS, Brexit and EU Citizens' Rights, we made a submission to on the progress of the Scheme.
Applying to the EUSS is mandatory for all EU citizens and other EEA/Swiss nationals who wish to continue living in the UK lawfully after the transition period. EU citizens have until 30 June 2021 to apply under the Scheme. If they do not apply in time, they will be unlawful residents in the UK. The Scheme’s strong suits and shortcomings have been discussed many a time. Our data and experience, collected since we started working with the EU delegation in 2018, enables us to map certain problematic patterns within the scheme and the way it operates. In last week’s briefing, we discussed the EUSS process up until the stage of applying to the Scheme, with a focus and communication and outreach that has been done to reach vulnerable EU citizens who need to apply to the Scheme. This week, we look at the next stage, namely what happens after submission of applications.
The government has hailed the EU Settlement Scheme as a great success, with 98% of applicants under the Scheme being granted status, and relatively few applications being refused. These numbers do speak for themselves to some extent. In recent months, however, we have seen a rise in refused and void applications.
Applications can be refused for different reasons, the main ones being that the applicant is not eligible for status under the Scheme, or that they are not suitable for status. The last set of EUSS statistics which included a breakdown of eligibility versus suitability refusals were issued in May 2020. These statistics stated of the 2,300 refusal decisions, 1% are refused on suitability with the remaining 99% refused on eligibility.
This may seem like a small percentage of suitability refusals. However, it only reflects suitability refusals where a valid application has been made to the EUSS. The most vulnerable applicants who are at risk of having their application refused based on suitability grounds are prisoners and immigration detainees. These individuals are severely restricted in their ability to make an application to the EUSS, and lack the adequate legal aid to do so. As a consequence, the likelihood is that they will receive their deportation decision before they are able to lodge an EUSS application. They are then stuck in a vicious circle: the deportation decision prevents them from being granted EUSS status, but they did not know they had to apply before they received the deportation decision.
The effect of this is the same as a refusing an EUSS application on suitability grounds. The Home Office guidance on ‘EEA decisions taken on grounds of public policy’ sets a low bar for the issuing of a deportation decision, meaning that many of these EEA nationals only have to reach that threshold in order to be liable for deportation. Arguably, this is inconsistent with the approach required by the Withdrawal Agreement, which grants EEA citizens more extensive protections. In other words, these EEA citizens are being refused the rights and benefits of their respective Withdrawal Agreements. As things stand now, these cases are not being clearly reported in the statistics. As a consequence, it is difficult to assess whether or not there is a systemic denial of Withdrawal Agreement rights, but the possibility is definitely there.
Regarding refusals on eligibility grounds, which forms the other 99% of refusals, the narrative presented by the Home Office is that caseworkers will only refuse an application if they have made numerous efforts to contact applicants to seek additional information. It is only when these request for additional information are not responded to that the Home Office is ‘forced’ to issue an eligibility refusal. In reality, this presentation is not consistent where the application can be refused because the applicant is applying as either a durable partner, or a dependent relative. Family members and dependent relatives have to send a “mandatory document” proving their relationship with the EEA national as part of the application process. If they fail to do so, these cases are refused quickly once the Home Office has confirmed that the applicant did not submit a relevant document, without necessarily contacting the applicant to request for additional information. In fact, applicants whose application was refused on those grounds of failing to provide a “mandatory document” confirmed that the Home Office made no attempt to contact them to request the relevant document and instead, refused them after a significant delay only informing them about the requirement to hold a relevant document in the refusal decision.
Following from that, it is essential that refusal decisions based on the fact that the applicant has not obtained a relevant document under the EEA Regulations prior to applying into the EUSS are issued before the deadline 31 December 2020. This is necessary because any refusal decision received after this date will prevent the family member from applying for an EEA Regulations relevant document which is mandatory to then succeeding under the EUSS. In essence, if they receive their refusal late, these applicants will be locked out of being granted EUSS status irrespective of whether or not their family situation meets the conditions of the Withdrawal Agreement. This would be denial of status on a procedural basis not on a substantive basis, and should be avoided at all costs.
In addition to a quick processing of these cases, Seraphus recommended that EUSS applicants who require EEA Regulations relevant documents should be entitled to apply for these up to 30 June 2021 based on a relationship that existed by 31 December 2020. This would be consistent with the intentions of the Withdrawal Agreement to ensure that family relationships in existence by 31 December 2020 are protected. By comparison, this approach is no different from requiring EUSS applicants to be resident in the UK before the end of the transition period and then having an additional six months to make the EUSS applications evidencing their eligibility.
When the Scheme was initially rolled out in 2018, there was no process in place to appeal a refused decision, meaning people whose application was refused had no way of challenging this decision. After complaints and campaigns to promote access to justice and a fair trial, the Home Office introduced the right of appeal for the EUSS in January 2020, but only for applications made on or after 31 January 2020. As a consequence, applicants who applied before 31 January 2020 are still unable to appeal their refusals. There does not seem to be any specific logic in denying an appeal right to applicants based on what is essential an arbitrary date for the purpose of the EUSS. Many of the cases refused before the cut-off date were part of the more complex share of applications, and were pending for a significant period of time (6 to 12 months), prior to refusal. Due to the lack of appeal routes, these individuals are forced to re-apply under the Scheme and again, wait for months before finding out the results.
As for invalid applications, there seems to be a communication breakdown between the Home Office and the applicants. Some EEA nationals come to outreach events and ask questions thinking they have valid applications pending but on examination, do not have any type of application outstanding. Applicants who do not have a certificate of application and are not aware of the necessity of this certificate have misunderstood something vital about the EUSS process which will ultimately lead to their application being invalidated. The reasons for this type of misunderstanding are diverse – for example, where applicants think that by scanning their passport or national identity card to the Home Office, they have made an application for status to remain in the UK. They do not realise that there is an additional online application form which must be submitted in order to complete the application process.
After the EUSS deadline has passed, there will be significant numbers of eligible citizens who believed that they had successfully made in EUSS application but instead have had their applications invalidated without their knowledge or understanding of what this meant. It is unclear whether such an excuse will be accepted by the Home Office as “good reason” for a late application, if the applicant in question realise that their initial application was not completed and then wants to reapply after the deadline.
To sum up, applicants and front-line workers need clarity on what reasons will constitute of good reason to apply to the EUSS after the deadline, as it looks like many individuals with previous refusals or with incomplete applications will end up having to apply after the deadline, and it is unknown whether those applications will be accepted. Refusals under the EUSS – whether on eligibility or suitability grounds – need to be communicated more effectively and more quickly. Additionally, the most complex applications such as family member applications, which cannot be made through the app but have to be submitted in paper-form, need to be prioritised as they are more time sensitive.
We will also need to assess whether the Home Office practice generally is in accordance with the Withdrawal Agreement. EU citizens, and their family members, living in the UK before the 31 December 2020 are beneficiaries of the Withdrawal Agreement and restrictions on those benefits, including the above practices, might be unlawful.
If you need assistance you can contact us here, call us on 020 8142 8211 or send us a question on WhatsApp.
According to a report published in 2019 the number of self-harm incidents in Colnbrook Immigration Removal Centre (IRC) has tripled since 2016. In 2015, 393 suicide attempts were reported in UK immigration detention centres. That same year, 2957 people in detention were put on suicide watch. In 2018, more than one person a day needed medical treatment for self-harming in detention, with the number of detainees on regular suicide watch still on the rise. Yet, the risk of suicide in detention is barely on the Home Office agenda.
In 2016, the Home Office called upon Stephen Shaw, former Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, to use his expertise and write a review on the welfare of vulnerable persons in detention. As a former government employee himself, he openly criticised some of the most irrational aspects of the Home Office’s policy towards vulnerable detainees.
In his report, Shaw highlighted some of the issues with the UK handling of Foreign National Offenders. These are the people who, once they finish their custodial sentence and are released from prison, often get stuck in detention for the longest periods of time. These are also the people who the Home Office have insisted on keeping in detention during the nine-week long (and counting) COVID-19 pandemic-induced lockdown, even though there has not been a realistic prospect of removal for months as planes were grounded all over the globe.
It is therefore on Foreign National Offenders that the effects of detention often weigh the most. Case in point is Michal Netyks, 35, who jumped from a first-floor window in HMP Altcourse in Liverpool on 7 December 2017. He had been due to be released from prison, having just completed his short criminal sentence. An inquiry found that Mr. Netyks had packed up his belongings and was waiting for his release when he was informed that he would continue to be detained under immigration powers pending possible deportation to Poland. He took his own life that very same day.
The Coroner’s report outlined numerous concerns with this practice, echoed in Shaw’s report. By de facto depriving ex-prisoners of their liberty indefinitely beyond their custodial release date, the Home Office shatters any hope and expectation of rebuilding and rehabilitating after a criminal offence. This is made infinitely worse by not giving prisoners any prior notice that they will be detained upon release from prison. In his review, Shaw wrote that this practice is most detrimental to the detainees’ mental health, fuelling suicidal tendencies and tragedies like Mr. Netyks’. Nevertheless, the Home Office made no changes to its policy; the responsibility for the horrendous consequences of this failure to act rests entirely on the government’s shoulders.
As a response to Shaw’s findings, the Home Office developed a new Adult at Risk policy for people held in detention under immigration powers. This new policy is underpinned by the rule 35 mechanism, which supposedly ensures that potential vulnerable adults are examined by a medical practitioner and that their detention is only maintained when there is absolutely no other option.
But the numbers tell us otherwise. In 2018, an average of two suicide attempts a day happened in UK detention centres. 56% of these attempts were committed by individuals who had a rule 35 report and were recognised vulnerable adults. Clearly, the rule 35 regime is not effective, despite the Home Office’s continued argument that they do everything in their power to flag up potential concerns about detainees’ suicidal tendencies.
Shaw also raised concerns about the concealment and coverups of deaths in detention. Generally, when someone dies in an IRC, the Home Office does not conform to the Ministry of Justice’s practice of publishing data on deaths of immigration detainees who passed away under Home Office supervision. That is why numbers and explanations are elusive, and thus, exacerbations of harm even harder to prevent. In Mr. Netyks’ case, the Coroner’s report found that files had actively been deleted and redacted by senior management, an alarming example of how non-transparent the Home Office is regarding death in detention.
Between 2000 and 2015, at least thirteen people committed suicide in detention. This accounts for 36% of the deaths that happened in detention in that same period of time. The high rate of self-inflicted deaths reflects the high rates of mental despair among immigration detainees caught in a system which is difficult to understand, and seems arbitrary and unfair. To prevent these horrible and inhumane results, it is not a question of improving the management of vulnerable people. Rather, the Home Office should ensure that they are not put in detention in the first please so as to avoid unnecessary and inhumane deaths and trauma.